Two Essays in the Philosophy of Economics by Green, Edward J. & Wilde, Louis L.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 
TWO ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS 
Edward J. Green and Louis L. Wilde 
..i..C,'1\lUTE O/: 
''\"" l'tc; �,.. �
� 
"& � � - 0 :5 Q
;.. .;,, 
� 
� 
,,,._ (( 
.,G-,.,,, ... � SkALL tA��\. 
Forthcoming in Philosophy in Economics, 
Joseph Pitt, ed., Western Ontario Series 
in The.Philosophy of Economics, 1980. SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 314 
April 1980 
ABSTRACT 
This paper addresses the question of how fundamental theories 
in economics (e.g. game theory and general equilibrium theories) are 
related to theories of specific markets or market phenomena. This 
question arises because, in neoclassical economics, fundamental 
theories typically are not subjected directly to empirical tests. 
The argument presented here has two parts. First it is argued that 
even.without being directly tested itself, fundamental theory can 
help to refine, test and evaluate specific theories. Six ways in 
which this can occur are enumerated. Second, it is argued that the 
close relationship between fundamental and specific theories is a 
general feature of positive economics rather than being a special 
feature of neoclassical theory, and that this relationship makes it 
possible systematically to test or evaluate fundamental theory. Views 
of Friedman, Machlup and von Mises are considered. 
ON THE ROLE OF FUNDAMENTAL THEORY IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 
Edward J. Green 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a standard distinction in economics between positive 
theory, which concerns law-like propositions about individual or 
aggregate economic behavior, and normative or welfare theory, which 
concerns the evaluation of alternative policies or institutions. 
In addition, contributions to economic theory are often classified 
according to whether they are "pure" or "applied." Although this 
classification is not a precise distinction, there is substantial 
agreement about which contributions are quite "pure" and which are 
rather "applied." The present paper concerns the relation between 
positive theories which lie toward opposite ends of this spectrum. In 
order to avoid some misleading implications of the traditional way of 
speaking, I will employ the term "fundamental theory" to refer to 
contributions which are usually called "pure," and "specific theory" 
to describe those which are usually called "applied." Although I will 
off er definitions of these terms, I do not intend to posit a rigid 
distinction, of which every contribution must fall unambiguously on 
either one side or the other. Another understanding which should be 
explicit at the outset is that, in discussing the role of fundamental 
theory, I will be systematically vague about the philosophical theory 
of science. My point will be that fundamental theory performs functions 
and satisfies criteria which would be necessary on any reasonable view 
of science, rather than that some particular view can explain its 
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existence and justify its usefulness. In particular, when I use terms 
like "empirically significant" and "research program," I intend these 
terms to be taken in a general way rather than in the technical senses 
which they have acquired in specific philosophical theories. 
Specific theories in positive economics are easy to recognize 
as scientific theories. In these specific theories, models of particular 
markets are formulated, and empirically significant consequences are 
derived. Questions like why these consequences are significant (e.g., 
that they are verifiable or refutable) may be matters of debate, but 
these are questions about science in general and not questions about the 
scientific status of economics. 
The parallel between fundamental economic theories and theories 
in the physical sciences is not so clear. Fundamental theories typically 
look like arguments from first principles to propositions devoid of 
empirical content: for instance, that a competitive equilibrium exists. 
Even within the economics profession, many have profound doubts about 
the value of such exercises. Concerning the existence of equilibrium in 
particular, many economists would subscribe to the view that "questions 
of nonexistent equilibria are virtually irrelevant. Clearly something 
is happening in the real world. The object of science is to explain 
these events. Dwelling on the possible nonexistence of these events is 
of questionable empirical value." [10 ,  pp. 526-527 ] Even the termi­
nology of "pure" versus "applied" theory seems to carry the implication 
that the former may be an essentially speculative endeavor. 
That this implication is false, and that fundamental and 
specific economic theories are really complementary, is the thesis of 
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this paper . The argument has two parts.  First , fundamental theory 
is defined , and an account is given of how, in neoclassical positive 
economics , fundamental theory enhances the acceptability of specific 
theory as a research program . This account should establish that 
fundamental theory cannot be isolated from specific theory as easily 
as is implied by the skeptical view quoted above. However , the account 
might be turned to charge that neoclassical specific theories are 
unacceptable because they depend on "unscientific" fundamental theory, 
rather than to argue that fundamental theory is "scientific" because it 
is of a piece with specific theory . The second part of the argument 
here will forestall this move by pointing out that reliance on 
fundamental theory is not a peculiar feature of neoclassical economics , 
and by suggesting that standard views of science indicate ways in which 
fundamental theories can be evaluated systematically . The second part 
of the argument will reinforce the first part by establishing that 
both fundamental theories and specific theories must be included in any 
viable research program in economics , whether neoclassical or other . 
2. THE USEFULNESS OF FUNDAMENTAL THEORY TO NEOCLASSICAL POSITIVE 
ECONOMICS
While specific theory has already been characterized in the 
introduction of this paper as the formulation and study of models of 
particular markets or market phenomena , fundamental theory has been 
described only as not being specific. In fact , it is typical for 
fundamental theory to be described either in this way , or else by 
enumeration of some fundamental theories , or else according to some 
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ad hoc criterion (e . g . , that fundamental theory uses advanced 
mathematics) . In view of the lack of a clear conception of what 
fundamental theory is , it is not surprising that there is uncertainty 
about how it is related to specific theory or whether it is related 
at all . A definition of fundamental theory will be offered now, and 
some ways in which fundamental theory contributes to the progress of 
specific theory in neoclassical positive economics will be discussed . 
I will define a fundamental economic theory to be a body of 
propositions which describe , in general term s ,  the relation between 
institutional structure and individual behavior. This notion of 
fundamental theory is similar to the idea of equilibrium theory 
proposed by Daniel Hausman [S] . The most important difference is 
that , while Hausman conceives of equilibrium theory as a determinate ,  
i f  implicit, body o f  propositions , I take fundamental theory to b e  a 
family of explicit theories which are distinct though closely related. 
For instance ,  one version of competitive theory might state that there 
are many firms with small efficient scales of production , while another 
might assume that each firm has a convex set of production possibilities 
but make no assumption about the number of firms. Each of these 
versions entails that the set of aggregate production possibilities 
for the economy is convex , which is an important condition for 
existence of equilibrium , and each covers some situations which the 
other does not . 
As a rule, fundamental theories in neoclassical economics 
consider explicitly the optimization problems of all agents studied. 
That is , institutional structure is represented as a specification of 
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these problems , and individual behavior of an agent is represented as 
optimal solution of a problem relative to some exogenously specified 
objective (i . e. tastes or profit maximization) .  Paradigmatic examples 
of fundamental theory are the theory of games (e. g. [9]) and the 
theory of general equilibrium (e . g .  [3] , [13]) . In general equilibrium 
theory, for instance , consumers' demand (individual behavior) 
determines the market-clearing price (institutional structure) ,  and 
the price determines consumers' budget sets in terms of which their 
demand is defined . 
In contrast to specific theories , it is often dif ficult to 
state in concrete terms why a fundamental theory is of interest. For 
example , the response of a fundamental theorist to an inquiry about his 
particular field of study might be , "I study the difference between 
monetary and barter economies.'' This theorist presumably has no 
intention of conferring with an anthropologist when his research is 
done , to find out whether there is an example of a pure barter economy 
which refutes or corroborates hi' theory. Rather , he may be trying to 
formulate reasonable conjectures about functions called "demand for 
money" and "utility of money holdings" which appear in monetary theory 
at a more applied level . His hope is that , when the specific theory 
is augmented by these conjectures , it will be a better scientific 
theory in terms of predictive power , refutability , and so forth. 
Viewed in this light , the fundamental theorist's work seems much more 
oriented toward application than it did at first glance . His initial 
description of his work suggests a speculative concern with exotic or 
non-existent economies, but his actual concern is quite down to earth . 
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The foregoing example illustrates two facts about fundamental 
theory in economics. First , the distinction between fundamental theory 
and specific theory cannot be based on the practical orientation of the 
latter. It is not the case that fundamental theorists are interested 
in a different set of phenomena from their colleagues . Second , 
fundamental theory is not an alternative research program to specific 
theory . In particular , the formulation by fundamental theorists of 
formal systems (e. g . ,  the Arrow-Debreu [ 3] model of general equilibrium) 
which differ markedly from those used in specific theory does not 
necessarily signal an effort to refute specific theory , or to compete 
with it in any way . 
Fundamental theories may,  as Hausman suggests in [SJ , serve 
an explanatory role of a special kind. However , this role does not 
exhaust their usefulness. In particular , fundamental theories can 
be used to help refine , test and evaluate specific theories . Six 
ways in which this may occur will now be enumerated . 
First , fundamental theory in some instances extends the 
domain of application of specific theory . One example of this 
phenomenon is Arrow's [l] theory of state-contingent securities which 
has (among other applications) advanced the study of financial markets 
by providing a tractable representation of complicated and diverse 
portfolios of financial assets. Another example is Lancaster's [6]  
theory of hedonic pricing , which provides a basis for the study of 
markets in which there is substantial product differentiation (e . g. ,  
automobiles) . 
Second , as in the example of the introduction , fundamental 
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theory sometimes suggests restrictions on the parameters of a specific 
theory which enhance the testability and predictive power of the latter. 
The best-known example of this is Slutsky's [11] characterization of 
demand functions which arise from utility-maximization. This 
characterization provides useful restrictions on the functional form 
of parametric demand functions for econometric estimation. 
Third , fundamental theory provides a unified description of 
phenomena which are observed in diverse specific fields. For instance ,  
there are convexity and continuity conditions which are sufficient 
both in game theory and in general equilibrium theory for existence of 
an equilibrium. If he can show that these conditions are met , a 
specific theorist is assured that he is working with a logically 
consistent set of assumptions . Moreover , in markets which behave 
pathologically (e. g. , "natural monopolies" where competition is 
technologically impossible to sustain) , investigation of precisely how 
conditions for the existence and efficiency of competitive equilibrium 
fail is an informative diagnostic exercise.  Such investigation some­
times leads to realization that apparently special features of diverse 
markets are in fact instances of a single phenomenon which can be 
systematically explained. A current attempt to unify such phenomena 
is the theory of signalling initiated by Spence [12] . This theory 
explains a number of instances of seemingly irrational market behavior 
(e . g. ,  setting of educational requirements for job applicants which 
are unrelated to their prospective duties , payment by firms of 
dividends although earnings could be distributed by other means which 
receive more favorable tax treatment) in terms of the unobservability 
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of quality differences among goods sold in a single market. 
Fourth , fundamental theory reconciles specific theories 
which apparently conflict, by distinguishing between their domains of 
application . Typically , several specific theories are embedded in a 
single general theory in such a way that the original theories are 
recoverable by imposing special conditions on parameters .  The 
classical case of such a reconciliation is Cournot's [2] embedding of 
the theories of monopoly and perfect competition in a game-theoretic 
theory of non-cooperative industry equilibrium . This general theory 
foreclosed the objection that refusal to consider industries with few 
firms as counterexamples to the theory of perfect competition , or 
refusal to consider industries with many firms as counterexamples to 
the theory of monopoly , constitutes an ad hoc avoidance of refutation. 
Fifth , fundamental theory helps to isolate tests between 
conflicting specific theories by facilitating precise analytical 
comparisons between them. For example , there is a long-standing 
controversy in the applied theory of the firm concerning whether 
managers try to maximize profits or share value . Using the theory of 
state-contingent securities , it may be shown that these two objectives 
coincide for a manager if investors can use assets of other firms to 
hedge their investments in the firm in question . Armed with this 
result , empirical economists are able systematically to avoid trying 
to analyze data which could not possibly discriminate between the two 
hypotheses . 
Sixth , fundamental theory provides informal criteria of 
coherence for specific theory. By this is meant something akin to the 
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"negative heuristic" described by Lakatos . Consider the case of 
Malthusian income-distribution theory. According to this theory , the 
working class population would grow until it was constrained by the 
immjnent threat of famine , while capitalists would limit their family 
size in order to allocate some of their resources to saving and 
investment so that their consumption could be maintained at a 
comfortable level . This description of affairs was supposed to be 
true in the long run , without workers ever learning from observation 
of the capitalists how to better their lot . In order to express the 
Malthusian law within a theory of utility maximization , it must be 
assumed that workers possess an insatiable sexual appetite or a 
fanatical desire to have large families , while capitalists have 
epicurean tastes. Such an attribution of preferences to economic 
agents would be formally consistent, but it is incredible . As a 
matter of scientific common sense , this theory would be removed from 
consideration. If applied theory were formulated by placing hypotheses 
directly on the behavior of agents,  the Malthusian theory would not be 
open to any obj ection on methodological grounds. This regulative use 
of utility-maximization seems to have an analogue in physics,  where 
an empirically successful applied theory would be viewed with suspicion 
if intellectual contortions were necessary to reconcile it with 
entrenched conservation principles . 
3. THE NATURE OF FUNDAMENTAL .SCONOMIC THEORY 
The discussion of the preceding section establishes that 
general equilibrium theory �-, ,; ;:;:<me theory need not be viewed as 
economic theories which are in opposition to the less elaborate 
specific theory typically used in neoclassical economics , but that 
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the former theories may be considered as giving an explicit foundation 
for the latter type . The present section is intended to support a 
stronger claim , that both types of theory are essential parts of any 
scientific research program in economics. This claim follows from two 
premises : First , that any complex of specific theories which is a 
competitor of neoclassical applied theory must also engender a 
fundamental theory which would serve the functions just described for 
the theories of utility-maximizing agents . Second , that the complex 
of specific theories remains indispensable to the research program 
associated with the fundamental theory because the latter is not 
independently testable. 
A general argument for the first premise will not be offered 
here . However, an example will be given which strongly suggests that 
a body of fundamental theory would arise within an alternative research 
program to neoclassicism . Consider a group of economists who accept 
the Malthusian population theory , and who are confronted with the 
rapid transfer of technology to third-world societies in the past 
several decades . This transfer indicates that groups of people who 
have traditionally enjoyed a low level of material welfare are willing 
and able to change their way of life radically in order to raise that 
level . This is prima facie evidence against the assumption that the 
working class will not curtail its birthrat� to raise per capita income . 
In order to accommodate this evidence ,  the ��o-Malthusians will require 
a fundamental theory (e. g . , a detailed soc,:. ;_::igical theory of the 
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influence of class on aspirations and behavior) which can explain why 
the entire population of a third-world country is not analogous to the 
working-class population of a technologically developed country . The 
reconciliation which this fundamental theory would provide between two 
specific theories (i . e . , those of population growth and of diffusion 
of technology) would be the same sort of reconciliation as Cournot's 
theory provided between the specific theories of monopoly and perfect 
competition. Thus , as in the case of neoclassical economics , 
fundamental theory would arise in response to the needs of specific 
positive theory . 
It might be supposed that , regardless of its origins , fun­
damental theory will ultimately become autonomous and challenge the 
role of specific theory in directing empirical inquiry . On the basis 
of such an assumption , fundamental economic theory has been judged to 
be an unsatisfactory scientific theory . In particular , it has been 
argued that either fundamental economic theory is presented at so high 
a level of abstraction that it is irrefutable , or else that its 
assumptions are so oversimplified that it must be false . If it is true 
that fundamental theory is autonomous , this argument may well be 
sound . However , the argument depends crucially on the assumption of 
autonomy . In the methodological writings of several economists there 
are two proposals to refute the argument (as applied to neoclassical 
theory) by denying the autonomy of fundamental theory . The remainder 
of this section will be devoted to characterizing the relation between 
fundamental and specific theory on which these proposals are based. 
Friedman [4] and Machlup [7] have written standard expositions 
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of one defense of the validity of utility maximization as a foundation 
for microeconomics . Both of these authors phrased their arguments in 
terms reminiscent of logical positivism , but that philosophical 
position is not essential to their point . What they suggested is 
that microeconomic theory is a partially interpreted theory , in which 
only qualitative propositions about market aggregates (i . e . , price and 
quantity) are empirically significant . The consumers and firms whose 
optimizing decisions are studied in order to derive these propositions 
are to be regarded as purely theoretical entities , according to 
Friedman and Machlup , and are not to be confused with actual agents. 
Consequently , they claimed , neoclassical microeconomics cannot be 
criticized on the basis of evidence from sources such as surveys and 
psychological experiments , which show that actual consumers and firm 
managers sometimes make inefficient or inconsistent decisions . 
While viewing exotic entities like quarks as fictitious may 
be a defensible position, it is not very persuasive to argue that the 
con�umers and firms of economic theory bear only coincidental resem­
blance to actual ones . This dubious assertion is not necessary to do 
what Friedman and Machlup require, though. All that they need to 
assert is that neoclassical pure theory represents agents as maximizing 
utility only within a limited class of situations (i.e . ,  those 
described in specific theories) ,  and that failure of agents to maximize 
utility in situations outside that class (e . g . , in experiments 
conducted in a psychology laboratory) would be irrelevant . On this 
view, an analogy might be drawn with the psychological theory that 
short-term and long-term memory are distinct mental processes . Most 
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laboratory experiments would be taken to deal with short-term memory, 
and so could not refute a theory that agents have perfect recall of 
material in long-term memory . Similarly, market decisions are 
typically made by agents whose experience and opportunity for 
deliberation clearly distinguish their situation from that of subjects 
in artificial laboratory experiments . Thus , inefficient or inconsis­
tent behavior by experimental subjects need not be counted as evidence 
against the hypothesis that economic decision-makers behave optimally . 
On the view that economic decision-making is a distinguished 
sphere of behavior, economic phenomena provide the only reliable 
evidence about the hypothesis that such decision-making is rational . 
Fortunately , the domain of economic phenomena is large and diverse . 
Although fundamental theory must always be tested jointly with a 
specific theory , there are as many distinct tests as there are areas of 
specific theory . Specific theories , then, serve as auxiliary hypotheses 
or "soft core theories" in tests of fundamental theory . Because no 
scientific theory is testable without such intermediation , pure 
economic theory is not in an exceptional position. In fact, fundamental 
economic theory may be particularly well situated because of the variety 
of tests offered by diverse specific theories.  
Of  course, the adoption of this view of the scientific status 
of fundamental theories does not make the immunity of neoclassical 
economics from psychological evidence a matter of a priori truth as 
does the partial-interpretation view. As Wilde [14] explains, the 
sphere of economic behavior might be construed to include laboratory 
situations. Whether this inclusion is appropriate is currently an 
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unsettled question . If laboratory situations are included , then the 
theory of how subjects.act is a specific economic theory, and a 
rejection of the utility-maximization hypothesis on the basis of 
experimental evidence would be consistent with the account just put 
forth of how fundamental theories are tested . 
A substantially different defense of neoclassical fundamental 
theory was set forth by von Mises [ 8] ,  who conceded that the hypothesis 
of utility-maximization is not capable of falsification, but who 
claimed that the theorists ' knowledge that economic agents are utility 
maximizers is a priori and that concern about its falsifiability is 
inappropriate . A reasonable interpretation of these claims would be 
thit fundamental theory is a logical meta-theory of specific theory , 
or that it is an explicit "heuristic" of the scientific research 
program to which it belongs . On this view, the beneficial effects of 
fundamental theory discussed in the last section are not ac cidental 
"spill-over" effects, but rather they constitute its essential 
scientific purpose . Fundamental theory is not really a theory at all , 
but instead it is a set of rules and recommendations about the construc­
tion and interpretation of applied theories .  I f  the application of 
these rules and recommendations is fruitful, then fundamental theory 
is successful . 
It is evident that both of the preceding accounts of 
fundamental theory presuppose the existence of a closely related body 
of specific theory . Although proponents of the two accounts might be 
seriously divided on other issues , they would agree that the critics 
of fundamental theory are attacking a straw man . Fundamental theory 
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simply does not exist as a self-contained body of putative scientific 
knowledge. 
4 .  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Terms like "competing research program" and "problem-shift" 
have sometimes been used to describe the emergence of an explicit body 
of fundamental theory alongside the specific theory of neoclassical 
economics.  Such descriptions imply that fundamental and specific theory 
conflict or are incommensurable . The argument of the present paper 
began with a detailed account of some of the close relations between 
fundamental and specific neoclassical economic theory . The existence 
of these relations indicates that conflict or incommensurability 
between the two types of theory is a much less serious problem than 
might have been thought, and it suggests that a different description 
of how the two types are related might be appropriate . 
The argument continued by suggesting that the emergence of 
fundamental theory is a characteristic event in the evolution of 
research programs in economics, rather than being a peculiar event 
in the history of neoclassical economics . The description is clearly 
consistent with the occurrence of the kinds of interactions between 
fundamental and specific theory which were already noted . Furthermore, 
the account of fundamental economic theory given here facilitates a 
clear statement of the replies of several prominent economists to 
objections raised against it . Specifically, the account enables these 
replies to be stated without appeal to idiosyncratic or contested 
philosophical theories of knowledge and meaning. While the arguments 
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considered were originally put forth in terms of the neoclassical 
theory of utility maximization, they have been shown here to be 
instances of general views about the relation between fundamental and 
specific theory in any economic research program . While they differ 
on what the role of fundamental theory is, each of these general views 
is clearly analogous to a standard account o f  the nature of physical 
sciences . 
While it is hoped that the present discussion has been 
sufficiently detailed to inspire confidence that fundamental economic 
theory is a legitimate scientific endeavor, obviously it has been far 
from complete. To begin with, each of the examples given in section 
two deserves a much more detailed examination than it has received . 
Also, it would be of interest to have corresponding examples from 
other economic research programs besides the neoclassical one. A 
striking feature of the definition of fundamental theory used here, 
having implications which deserve careful attention, is that it places 
far more emphasis on institutions than is traditional. An explicit 
theory of the domain of economic phenomena and of economic evidence 
is needed if the view that fundamental theories are tested via specific 
theories is to be considered seriously . The view of von Mises also 
raises questions, for instance, about how the deductive arguments of 
fundamental theories contribute to their usefulness as prescriptions. 
Work on problems such as these should lead to a clearer understanding 
of the structure of economic reasoning, and of the relation between 
economics and the other sciences. 
1 .  
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ON THE USE OF LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS IN ECONOMICS 
Louis L .  Wilde 
Twenty years ago the focus of welfare economics began to 
shift from comparing allocations in a given economic environment to 
comparing systems of economic organization which might operate within 
entire classes of economic environments . This " (new)2 welfare 
economics, "  to use Reiter ' s  [1977]  term, is not simply concerned with 
the outcome of a given system, but rather is concerned also with 
practical features of systems such as administrative feasibility, 
computational complexity, and cost of operation . Indeed the entire 
"Public Choice" approach to welfare economics is a manifestation of 
this shift in emphasis . Reiter discusses a number of formal examples 
of this kind of work, including the well-known formulation by Ted 
Groves and John Ledyard of a government allocation-taxation system for 
the optimal provision of public goods [Groves and Ledyard, 1977 ] . 
In spite of its focus on "real-world " considerations, most 
of the (new)2 welfare economics has been theoretical. There are 
several reasons for this . First, the initial conceptualization of 
the problem was due to theoris ts . Their work has been very abstract 
and demands of the reader a substantial degree of mathematical 
sophistication . It has, therefore, not been generally accessible to 
either applied economists or decisionmakers who might be in a position 
to make use of the theoretical results . Second, empirical work has 
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been difficult in this area . Often the institutions of interest do 
not exist and, in cases where they do, data which might allow 
theoretical results to be tested is hard to obtain. Finally, many of 
the theoretical results do not make predictions but rather suggest 
how institutions with desirable features ought to be designed. The 
needed nontheoretical work is therefore more along the lines of 
implementation than testing . 
One possible solution to the absence of nontheoretical 
work in the (new)2 welfare economics is nonlaboratory experiments . 
However, this solution has difficulties of its own . Nonlaboratory 
experiments tend to be very expensive, often prGhibitvely so. 
They also require the cooperation of individuals whose maj or priority 
is making decisions, not contributing to economics at a basic 
scientific level . 1 
Another possible solution to the problem, and the one which 
is of primary interest here, is laboratory experiments. The use of 
laboratory experimental techniques in economics has increased 
dramatically in recent years, and virtually all of the maj or economics 
j ournals have begun to publish the results of laboratory experiments . 
This increased interest has been a direct response to the absence of 
nontheoretical work in the (new)2 welfare economics. 
The purpose of this paper is to review, and develop when needed, 
needed, the foundations of the use of laboratory experimental 
techniques in economics (as propounded by economists) .  This task 
will be undertaken in the next section of the paper .  The discussion 
there will be based on the work of Charles Plott and Vernon Smith, 
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although some modifications of their "precepts" and "axioms" will be 
necessary . A third section will briefly discuss limitations of 
laboratory experiments . 2 
2 .  A PRECEPTUAL FOUNDATION 
In the introduction it was suggested that the use of 
laboratory experimental techniques in economics has arisen in response 
to the need for a nontheoretical (new) 2 welfare economics. One reason 
for taking this point of view is that even though economists are 
interested in both individuals and institutions, systematic 
rationalizations of the use of laboratory experiments by economists 
have been developed only for the latter . Furthermore, a number of 
recent laboratory experiments have been designed to study the 
implementation of particular theoretical systems . For example, 
Smith [1975] and Ferej ohn, Forsythe and Noll [1979] both analyze 
practical aspects of decentralized decisionmaking systems for public 
goods such as those formulated by Groves and Ledyard [1977]. In 
spite of this work, thought on the subj ect is still in its infancy 
and is being continually refined as practical experience accumulates . 
In fact, the "literature" consists primarily of two papers, one by 
Vernon Smith [1977] and the other by Charles Plo tt [1978]. This 
paper will draw heavily on the work of Plott and Smith . However, 
several significant modifications of the foundations offered by those 
authors will be introduced. 
The basic idea behind a laboratory experiment in economics 
is to create a small-scale microeconomic environment in the laboratory 
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where adequate control can be maintained and accurate measurement 
of relevant variables guaranteed.  The definition of a microeconomic 
environment which I will use starts with Reiter's description of an 
"economic environment . "  An economic environment consists of a list 
of agents {l, . . .  ,n} and commodities {l, . . .  ,t} . Each agent is described 
by a preference relation � (represented generally by a utility
function ui) ,  a technology Ti (represented generally by a production 
possibilities set) and an initial endowment vector, wi 
agent is thus described by a triple, ei = (a.., Ti, wi) .
"-'1 
The lh 
Commodity 
t space is taken to be IR • Given that the list of commodities is
fixed, the economic environment is then described by e = (e1, . . .  ,en) .
To complete a microeconomic environment one needs to 
specify the institutional setting. As a theoretical matter, this is 
the focus of the exercise.  For our purposes, a very simplified 
formalization will be adequate. Let individual i have the opportunity 
to make a decision d. ED . .  Each individual is assumed t o  select d. 
1 1 1 
so as to maximize ui (note that externalities are not ruled out) . 
An institution is defined by the collection of sets D = n1 x • . .  x Dn and 
a mapping I: D+ Rtn which takes decisions into final allocations . 
A microeconomic environment is then described by E = (e, I). 
The essential features of the above construction are as 
follows . First, a microeconomic environment is composed primarily 
of two elements, a collection of individuals and an institutional 
setting. Second, two properties characterize the individuals; they 
are assumed to possess consistent preferences and to make decisions 
so as to maximize their own well-being. Third, these decisions act 
through the institutional setting in order to determine final outcomes . 
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A laboratory expe,riment in economics attempts to create and 
study a small-scale microeconomic environment . Its purpose is to 
uncover systematic relationships between individual preferences, 
institutional parameters, and outcomes .
3 
To realize this purpose, the 
experimentor must have control over both the preferences of the 
individuals participating in the experiment and the institutional 
parameters which govern final allocation s .  Thus, the initial tasks 
of the experimentor are to ensure that a genuine microeconomic 
environment has been created, and to ensure that enough control over 
individual preferences and institutional parameters can be maintained 
to uncover any systematic relationships between them and final outcomes . 
It is my aim here to find a set of sufficient conditions which, if 
satisfied, will guarantee that these requirements have been satisfied . 
Consider first the control of individual preferences . 
Sufficient conditions for such control are based on the theory of 
"induced value" as developed by Smith [1976, 1977).  Smith's theory is 
implemented by mapping final allocations into a reward structure . If 
the reward structure satisfies certain properties (detailed below) then 
adequate control over preferences can be guaranteed . 
Smith identifies three "precepts" as constituting a 
foundation for the use of laboratory experiments in the study of 
resource allocation mechanisms . These are nonsatiation, complexity, 
and parallelism. The term precept is adopted here directly from 
Smith . Apparently he uses it to suggest that his three conditions 
are properties only intended to connote general rules of action related 
to proper experimental design. They are thus not to be regarded as 
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self-evident truths (as the term axiom might imply) or as strictly 
sufficient conditions for a valid experiment . Indeed, Smith never 
states in any general way the obj ectives which govern the design of 
laboratory experiments, so that it is impossible to interpret the 
precepts as sufficient conditions for a "valid" experiment . Never-
theless, they provide an extremely useful starting point for 
developing such a set of sufficient conditions . 
According to Smith, nonsatiation requires that "given a 
costless choice between two alternatives, identical except that the 
first yields more of the reward medium (e.g . currency) than the 
second, the first will always be chosen (preferred) over the second, 
by an autonomous individual . 114 Complexity recognizes that "in general"
individual decisionmakers must be assumed to have multidimensional 
values which attach nonmonetary subj ective cost or value to (1) the 
process of making and executing individual or group decisions, (2 ) 
the end result of such decisions, and (3) the rewards (and perhaps 
behavior) of other individuals involved in the decision process . 115 
Parallelism asserts that "propositions about the qualitative behavior 
of individuals and of markets and other resource allocation mechanisms 
that have been tested in laboratory experiments apply also to 
nonlaboratory environments where similar ceteris paribus conditions 
prevail . 116 
Smith's precepts are intended to guarantee that a well-
defined microeconomic environment has been created in the laboratory, 
that adequate control over that environment can be maintained, and 
that any "results" obtained are relevant outside the laboratory . 
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Consider the first of these goals. A well-defined microeconomic 
environment requires that individuals have consistent preferences and 
act so as to maximize their own well-being. Nonsatiation guarantees 
that both these requirements will be satisfied . However, a well­
defined microeconomic environment also requires that individual 
decisions act through an institutional s etting in order to determine 
final allocations which, in turn, determine rewards. In other words , 
rewards earned by individuals must be tied to their decisions . None 
of Smith's precepts guarantee that this requirement is satisfied. 
Thus a fourth precept, which I will call saliency, must be added to 
Smith's precepts. Saliency requires that the reward earned by an 
individual is tied to decisions made by that individual . 
Together saliency and nonsatiation guarantee that the 
requirements o f  a well-defined microeconomic environment are satisfied . 
Saliency implies that the amount of the reward medium earned is 
linked to the decisions made by the subj ects and nonsatiation implies 
that the amount of the reward medium earned is always important to 
the subj ects. Thus a reward structure which satisfies saliency and 
nonsatiation can also be used to control preferences systematically . 
An example o f  a particular experiment will make this clear. 
Consider an experimentor who wishes to study repeated oral 
double auction markets . An oral double auction is a very simple 
institution. A single homogeneous good is to be bought and sold . 
There are two types of agents, buyers and sellers . All buyers can 
make bids and all sellers can make o ffers. These bids and offers are 
displayed for all agents to see. If a bid is made by a buyer which 
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is acceptable to a seller, that seller simply accepts the bid and a 
transaction is recorded. Smiliarly, if an offer is made by a seller 
which is acceptable to a buyer, that buyer simply accepts the offer 
and a transaction is recorded . All agents observe the prices at 
which transactions are made . In any given market period, a fixed 
demand curve and fixed supply curve :i:',eflect agents' preferences . 
Over time, the same basic market is repeated, with the time path of 
transaction prices the focus of analysis. 
In order to study this institution experimentally, it is 
necessary to "induce" preferences which will generate desired market 
demand and supply curves. On the demand side, subj ects are given a 
table listing monetary rewards to be provided by the experimentor 
for units of the commodity bought . The subj ects then earn the 
difference between the total "redemption value" of the units they 
have bought and the costs incurred in their purchase . As long as 
the subj ects prefer more money to less, the redemption values 
specified by the experimentor constitute a well-defined demand curve. 
Si�ilarly, on the supply side, subj ects are given a table listing
monetary costs to be assessed by the experimentor for units of the 
commodity sold . The subj ects then earn the difference between the 
total revenue they have collected from sales and the total cost of 
the units they have sold. Again, as long as the subj ects prefer more 
money to less, the costs specified by the experimentor constitute a 
well-defined supply curve . Shifts in the demand curve can be 
accomplished by changing the redemption values. Shifts in the supply 
curve can be accomplished by changing the initial costs. Moreover, 
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the same demand curve or supply curve can be induced on different 
subj ect pools by using identical redemption values or initial costs . 
Consider nonsatiation and saliency in terms of this example . 
Nonsatiation is satisfied by the reward structure because it is 
reasonable to assume that subj ects prefer more money to less . 
Saliency is satisfied by the reward structure because buyers earn 
the difference between the redemption value and the sale price 
while sellers earn the difference between the sale price and the 
initial cost . Hence buyers have an incentive to minimize the sale 
price and sellers have an incentive to maximize it. 
Using this process of inducing values to control preferences 
is not without its difficulties. Problems can arise from two distinct 
sources . First, subj ects may place additional subj ective valuations 
on their participation in the experiment, over and above any direct 
payoff they receive in terms of the reward medium . Some subj ects 
may enj oy making the calculations and decisions required of them 
by the experiment, while others may find such activity 
arduous. Second, subj ects may also place subj ective valuations on 
the rewards earned by other participants in the experiment. For 
example, equity may be of great concern to some subj ects . The former 
effect is usually controlled by using a reward structure with high 
payoffs . I will refer to this as dominance of the reward structure . 
The latter effect is usually controlled (when appropriate) by keeping 
subj ects uninformed o f  the overall pattern of the reward structure 
across individuals . I will refer to this as privacy of the reward 
structure . If the reward structure satisfies dominance and privacy 
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then Smith's precept of complexity, which is stated more as a 
cautionary warning than as a rule of action, will have been rendered 
moot . 
I 
Consider again the oral double auction market described 
above . Dominance is satisfied by the reward structure because a 
"commission" is usually paid on all transactions (this ensures that 
marginal units will be traded) and privacy is satisfied by the reward 
structure because agents see only bids and offers, not redemption 
values and initial costs (often they are isolated at computer 
terminals and thus never come into contact with each other ) .  
Suppose now that the reward structure satisfies saliency, 
nonsatiation, dominance, and privacy . Then, in fact, the laboratory 
experiment constitutes a small-scale microeconomic environment in 
which real economic agents make real economic decisions . Moreover, 
these decisions are based on values controlled by the experimenter . 
Control is crucial because it is necessary for measurement and thus 
replicatability . Replicatability, in turn, allows the experimenter 
to identify systematic relationships between preferences, institutional 
parameters and outcomes . These systematic relationships constitute 
the "results" of laboratory experiments in economics . In other words, 
any systematic relationship between preferences, institutional 
parameters, and outcomes which has been identified by replication is 
by definition a result . The final question is, of what use are these 
results? 
To date three distinct uses of laboratory experimental 
techniques in economics have been discussed . They are: (a) the 
appropriateness of competing theories can be distinguished; (b) 
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theories which are clearly nonsense can be exposed; and (c) experience 
can be obtained with new modes of organization . These three cases 
have been analyzed in depth by Plott [1978 ] where several examples 
of each are provided . Herein only a cursory discussion will be 
offered . 
The use o f  laboratory experiments to distinguish between 
competing theories is perhaps the most classic. As Smith puts it, 
"the best experiment is the crucial experiment whose outcome clearly 
distinguishes between competing theories . 117 The problem, of course,
is that the conditions which define the crucial experiment rarely 
occur naturally . But they can often be created in the laboratory . 
It is important to note here that a crucial experiment need 
not be "realistic" in the sense that nonlaboratory experiments are .  
It only needs t o  include those parameters relevant t o  the theories 
which are to be tested. If it does (assuming that saliency, 
nonsatiation, dominance, and privacy are satisfied by the reward 
structure) then any failure to distinguish between competing theories 
is the fault of the theories, not the experiment . 
This point is valid with respect to the use of laboratory 
experiments to rej ect some theories as nonsense, too . That is, if 
an experiment includes all parameters relevant to a particular theory, 
and if the theory fails to predict well in the simplified setting of 
the laboratory, then it cannot be expected to predict well in more 
complex environments . Again, the only requirements needed to reach 
this conclusion are that saliency, nonsatiation, dominance, and 
privacy are satisfied by the reward structure . The experiment does 
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not need to be "realistic" and no presumptions need be made about its 
connection to more complex ("real-world") environments . 
The third use of laboratory experiments, to gain experience 
with new modes of organization is different in this regard . Instead 
of starting with an existing mode of organization and trying to 
develop and test theories related to it, the researcher starts with a 
theoretical concept which is "devoid of operat ional detail . 118 The
task is to construct a new mode of organization which exhibits the 
!desired performance features . Plott has referred to this as 
"institutional engineering . 119 It is precisely the nontheoretical
(new)
2 
welfare economics discussed in the introduction of this paper . 
For this use o f  laboratory experiments to be valid, more than saliency, 
nonsatiation, dominance, and privacy of the reward structure is 
required . There must be a link to nonlaboratory environments . This 
is where Smith's precept of parallelism becomes important . 
Recall that parallelism asserts that "propositions about 
the qualitative behavior of individuals and of markets and other 
resource allocation mechanisms that have been tested in laboratory 
experiments apply also to nonlaboratory environments where similar 
ceteris paribus conditions prevail . 1110 In terms of the definitions 
introduced above, this precept might be rephrased as asserting that 
the results of laboratory experiments apply to any microeconomic 
environment where similar ceteris paribus conditions prevail . The 
reasons for this rephrasing are twofold . First, "propositions about 
the qualitative behavior of individuals and of markets and other 
resource allocat ion mechanisms that have been tested in laboratory 
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experiments" are generally statements concerning relationships between 
preferences, institutional parameters, and outcomes . The only such 
statements which are valid are those which can be replicated . Such 
statements , however, constitute the "results" of any experiment . 
Secondly, the distinction between laboratory and nonlaboratory 
environments is irrelevant . What is important is that the results 
apply to � microeconomic environment where similar ceteris paribus 
conditions prevail . Here it is important to recognize that "similar 
ceteris paribus conditions" prevailing does not mean identical 
environments . It means in part that parameters affecting preferences 
or institutional structure are held constant except those relating 
to the behavioral propositions under study . These constant parameters 
need not be identical.  
Parallelism is crucial to j ustifying the third, and 
potentially most fruitful, use of laboratory experimental techniques 
in economics listed above . As such, it is by no means noncontroversial . 
In fact , a maj or criticism of laboratory experiments is that they 
are unrealistic .  That is, individuals and institutions in the real-
world are claimed to be much more complex than their laboratory 
counterparts, and therefore any results obtained through laboratory 
experiments have no relevance to real-world behavior . Such 
criticisms either attack the theory of induced value as embodied 
in the precepts of saliency, nonsatiation , dominance and privacy 
or they attack the precept of parallelism. Smith offers two 
responses to the latter . 
"First , if the purpose of the experiment is to test a theory, 
are the elements of alleged unrealism in the experiment 
parameters of the theory? If not then the criticism must 
be directed to the theory as much as to the experiment . 
Laboratory experiments are normally as "rich" as the 
theories they test . Secondly, are there field data to 
support the criticism, i . e .  data suggesting that there 
may be differences between laboratory and field behavior .  
I f  not, then the criticism is pure speculation; if yes, 
then it is important to parameterize the theory to 
include the behavior in question . "1
1 
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Attacks on the theory of induced valued are primarily questions 
of methodology since the theory itself is internally consistent . 12 But 
in this case replication is the key. If replicable relationships 
between preferences , institutional parameters, and outcomes have been 
identified, then the researcher must extend or modify existing theory 
to explain the relationships.  After all, it is only necessary that 
saliency and nonsatiation be satisfied in order that a microeconomic 
environment exist . Everything else is simply a matter of control and 
measurement . 
The modifications of Smith ' s  preceptual foundation introduced 
above were necessary to ensure that a genuine microeconomic environment 
was created and to ensure that enough control over individual 
preferences and institutional parameters could be maintained to uncover 
any systematic relationships between them and outcomes . One final 
problem with Smith's preceptual foundation is that the concept of 
"similar ceteris paribus conditions" is not defined in a precise way . 
It is here that Plott [1978]  becomes particularly relevant . 
As in this paper, Plott starts with Smith ' s  theory of induced 
value, introducing two additional "axioms . 1113 Axiom one is that "the
relationship between outcomes, preferences and institutions are 
(supposed to be) independent o f  the social alternatives. 1115 
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Axiom one essentially asserts that relationships between 
preferences, inst itutional parameters, and outcomes are independent 
o f  the sources of preferences . To paraphrase Plott's example, it is
irrelevant whether a person is willing to pay ten dollars maximum 
for a shirt because (a) he or she thinks it is pret ty, (b) a friend 
thinks it is pretty, or (c) it tastes goo d .  In each case, that person's 
contribution to the total market demand for shirts is the same and, 
hence, so is the equilibrium price of shirts . 
Axiom two essentially asserts that "labels" don't matter . 
Thus a competitive market for wheat should exhibit the same qualitative 
properties as a competitive market for health services . 
These two axioms are closely related to parallelism. In 
part icular, they are necessary for parallelism but not sufficient.  
In essence, they begin to define "similar ceteris paribus conditions" 
in a precise way. Ultimately, we would like to find a set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions which fully characterize the concept of 
ceteris paribus in the context of parallelism . Whether such a set of
"axioms" can be found is an unresolved issue . Nevertheless the notion
of ceteris paribus is crucial to all of economics, and thus at tempts
to find such a set of "axioms" is of benefit to the entire profession, 
not just experimen talists. 16 
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3 .  LIMITATIONS OF THE USE OF LABORATORY EXPERIMENTAL TECHNIQUES IN 
ECONOMICS 
So far in this paper, a set of sufficient conditions has 
been identified which, if satisfied, guarantee that laboratory 
experimental techniques are appropriate nontheoretical tools for 
economists . Nonsatiation and saliency of a reward structure ensure 
that a well-defined microeconomic environment has been created, 
dominance and privacy of a reward structure ensure that enough c·ontrol 
over individual preferences and institutional parameters can be 
maintained to uncover any systematic relationships between them and 
outcomes, and parallelism ensures that any results obtained are 
useful outside the laboratory. Nothing yet has been said about when 
these conditions are likely to be satisfied . 
It is no t my intention to draw specific conclusions 
regarding this matter, but rather to make the point that criticisms 
of laboratory experiments must focus on precisely this issue . Section 
2 of this paper indicates that laboratory experimental techniques can 
be valid tools for economists . The relevant questions are whether 
the sufficient conditions identified in this paper are ever likely 
to be satisfied in general or, more importantly, whether they are in 
fact satisfied in particular cases . An argument that they are not 
likely to be satisfied in general seems implausible, but there are 
undoubtedly examples of particular cases in which they fail . 
Economists have gained experience with a wide spectrum of 
experiments in recent years, from relatively simple bargaining 
experiments [Roth and Malout, 197 9 ] ,  to the oral double auctions 
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described in the last section ,17 to relatively complicated market 
experiments such as Hong and Plott [1977]  (which analyzed the 
implications o f  rate filing for the domes tic dry bulk transportation 
industry on inland U . S .  waterways) and Plott and Wilde [1979]  (which 
analyzed markets for professional diagnosis and services) . These 
experiments are listed seemingly in order of those most likely to 
satisfy the sufficient conditions of section 2 to those least likely 
to do so , given the present level o f  understanding. This assertion 
is premature , however, because laboratory experimental techniques are 
new to economists . They do hold much promise ,  though , and such strong 
j udgments should really be suspended until more research has been 
done. 
1 .  
2 .  
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FOOTNOTES 
*I would like to thank Ed Green , Charles Plo t t ,  Alan Schwartz , 
and Vernon Smith for helpful comments on the first draft of
this paper . 
Nonlaboratory experiments include token economies as well as 
"real-world" economies .  For a review o f  the former see Tarr 
[1976 ] , for an -example of the latter see Manning , Mitchell and 
Acton [197 6 ] . 
Animals have been used as subj ects in some laboratory experiments 
by economis ts . Issues related to the use of such experiments 
in economics go well beyond this paper . See Kagel et . al [1975]  
for examples of this type of research . 
3 .  This statement is adopted from Plott ' s  "fundamental equation" 
(Plot t ,  [1978] ) .  It  is nevertheless controversial . 
Uses o f  laboratory experimental techniques will be discussed in 
more detail later in this paper . 
4 .  Vernon Smith , (1977) , p .  3 .  
5 .  Ibid . ,  p .  5 .  
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6 .  Ibid . , p .  7 .  
7 .  Ibid . , p .  8 .  
8 .  Charles Plott , (1978) , p .  36 . 
9 .  The choice o f  this label was certainly not accidential . Notice 
the relationship between the use of labroatory experiments and 
"demonstration" proj ects in large-scale R & D .  
10 .  Smith, (1977) , p .  7 .  
11 . Ibid . , p .  8 .  
12 . One point o f  this paper is that the "theory" of induced 
preferences is not really a theory at all . 
13 . The term "axiom" is Plott ' s .  He apparently uses it because 
these properties are true of all economic models . 
14 . Plott , (1978) , p .  3 .  
15 . Ibid . , p .  6 .  
1 6 .  In commenting o n  an earlier draft of this paper , Vernon Smith 
also pointed out the need to articulate what ceteris paribus 
17 . 
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might mean in the context of parallelism. This is a complicated 
and important issue , but not one I intend to resolve in this 
paper . 
This is perhaps the best understood experimental institution. 
A number of variants of the basic oral double auction have also 
been s tudied (e . g .  Isaac and Plott , [197 8 ] )  and some sophisticated 
theoretical work has also been done in response to this work 
(Easley and Ledyard , [ 1979] ) .  
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